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CONSUMER PROTECTIONS AND LIMITED LIABILTY:  
GLOBAL ORDER FOR AIR TRANSPORT? 
  
 
Steven Truxal* 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The proliferation of air passenger rights regimes around the globe, at least half of which were 
introduced in the past seven years, presents a real challenge for many stakeholders in air 
transport. On the one hand, national rules often vary from state to state; they overlap and are 
often complex or conflicting, which can be seen as creating rather ambiguous liability for the 
air transport sector, in particular for airlines and airports. On the other hand, the inherent 
nature of air transport is that it is international. A passenger holding a common itinerary may 
have rights under one or more air passenger rights regimes during his or her journey. If the 
travel does not go exactly as planned, attempts by the affected passenger to acquire 
information about, understand and enforce his or her consumer rights may prove onerous. 
National authorities could also fail to provide adequate complaint handling and compliance 
checking procedures. What results ultimately flies in the face of the purported aims of 
national and regional regimes, which surely is to provide consumer protection. 
 
 This comment identifies recent developments at the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO), a UN specialized agency, within the sphere of consumer protection for 
air transport. The current state of affairs is considered alongside discussion on certain aspects 
of the current air passenger rights in the European Union (EU) and the limited air carrier 
liability regime of the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International 
Carriage by Air (‘Montreal Convention’) 1999, and the issues that arise with respect to 
interpretation and application of the law. The following reveals the significance of the 
intersection of consumer protection for passengers at national and regional levels, and limited 
liability for airlines at international law, that has given rise to a recent call for global order 
vis-à-vis core principles on air passenger rights at international law.  
 
 
II. Core Principles 
 
At its 38th General Assembly (‘the Assembly’), held between 24 September and 4 October 
2013 in Montréal, ICAO’s Economic Commission called on the Council to ‘develop, in the 
short term, a set of high-level, non-prescriptive core principles on consumer protection, for 
use as policy guidance, which strike an appropriate balance between protection of consumer 
and industry competitiveness and which take into account the needs of States for flexibility, 
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given different State social, political and economic characteristics; with existing instruments, 
in particular that of the [Montreal Convention]’. 1  At the Assembly, on the basis of 
recommendations made at the Sixth Worldwide Air Transport Conference (ATConf/6) held 
in March 2013, representatives from Columbia, the Dominican Republic, Singapore and 
Lithuania, on behalf of the 28 Member States of the European Union (EU) and 16 additional 
European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) States, with the support of key industry 
organisations such as International Air Transport Association (IATA), Airports Council 
International (ACI) and the World Tourism Organization (UN WTO), each presented 
working papers in support of core principles for consumer protection in air transport. Several 
other ICAO States and observers offered oral submissions that were widely supportive.  
 
 Interestingly, ICAO Member States also adopted the Montreal Convention as successor to 
the Warsaw Convention 1929; to date, only 103 of the 191 ICAO Member States have 
ratified it.2 According to IATA, the Montreal Convention ‘creates an exclusive and uniform 
legal framework for air carrier liability in the international air carriage of passengers and 
baggage, including damages caused by flight delays.’3 This, as will be shown below, aligns 
with the purported compatibility of the EU regime with international law. Scholars argue that 
the Convention deals specifically with the misfeasance of the contract of carriage; leaving 
‘non-feasance’ to the law of obligations. 4  It follows that air passenger rights regimes, 
however, seek to provide redress to the affected passenger; they do not necessarily question 
what happens to the flight. 
 
 
III. The EU Regime: Regulation 261/2004 
 
The current air passenger rights in the European Union (EU) serve as a useful regime to 
compare and explore how international law in this area, the Montreal Convention, has been 
interpreted and applied by national courts of EU Member States and the Court of Justice of 
the EU (CJEU).  
 
 Aviation was the first sector to benefit from passengers rights in the EU following the 
Package Travel Directive (90/314/EEC)5 and Denied Boarding Regulation (295/91/EEC)6, 
                                                 
* Senior Lecturer, The City Law School, City University London. Honorary Fellow, Centre for British Studies, 
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. B.A., Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington 
University, LL.M., Ph.D., University of Westminster. 
1
 ICAO, Report of the Economic Commission on Agenda Item 40 (Working Paper, A38-WP/409, 2013) 40-6. 
2
 The EU has also ratified the Montreal Convention; Council Decision (EC) 2001/539 on the conclusion by the 
European Community of the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air 
(the Montreal Convention) [2001] OJ L194/38. 
3
 ICAO, Consumer Protection: A Joined Up Approach Required Between Governments and Industry (Working 
Paper, ATConf/6, WP/68, 2013) 2. 
4
 PPC Haanappel, ‘The New EU Denied Boarding Compensation Regulation of 2004’, 54 Zeitschrift fur Luft- 
und Weltraumrecht [2005] 22. 
5
 Council Directive (EEC) 90/314 on travel, package holidays and package tours [1990] OJ L158/59; See also 
European Commission, Commission Working Document on the Council Directive 90/314/EEC of 13 June 1990 
on travel, package holidays and package tours (2007); The Package Travel Directive was one of eight directives 
covered by the Review of the Consumer Acquis. In the light of the outcome of the consultation on the Green 
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the latter of which was repealed by the current EU rules under Regulation (EC) No 261/2004. 
Since coming into force in early 2005, Regulation 261/2004 has been both topical and 
contentious.  
 
 According to the European Commission, ‘Europe’s success in securing and upholding 
passenger rights is one of the resounding achievements of EU transport policy.’7 With that 
said, the CJEU has on numerous occasions, in response to references made by national courts 
of EU Member States, interpreted the meaning and applicability of Regulation 261/2004. It 
should come as no surprise, therefore, that critics from both consumer groups and industry 
have been vociferous in their concerns from the very start. On the whole, CJEU jurisprudence 
on the ambiguities of Regulation 261/2004 can be seen as lacking certainty, from which 
ensues confusion around the extent of air passenger rights and air carrier liability.   
 
 Over the past two years alone, the CJEU’s interpretation and expanded jurisprudence have 
included such crucial matters as compensation for flights cancelled owing to technical 
failures8 and airport strikes9, or even following closure of airspace owing to ‘extraordinary 
circumstances’ occasioned by a volcanic eruption10 ; time limits for passengers to bring 
claims11; the freedom to opt–in to flight cancellation insurance12; and most recently, air 
carrier liability for baggage containing personal property of one party checked in under 
another party’s name.13 
 
 
IV. Conflict or Inconsistency? 
 
There are a number of instances of potential conflict or inconsistency between the EU air 
passenger rights regime where interpretation and application of the Montreal Convention are 
concerned. In IATA and ELFAA, for example, the CJEU held on the question of the EU 
regime’s consistency with international law as follows: ‘Since the assistance and taking care 
of passengers envisaged by Article 6 of Regulation No 261/2004 in the event of a long delay 
to a flight constitute such standardised and immediate compensatory measures, they are not 
                                                                                                                                                        
Paper and the input to the consultation in this working document, the Commission will consider the need for a 
reform of the Directive. 
6
 Regulation (EEC) 295/91 establishing common rules for a denied–boarding compensation system in scheduled 
air transport [1991] OJ L36/5. 
7
 European Commission Press Release, ‘Top News’ (12 March 2013) Agenda/13-9. 
8
 Case C–549/07, Friederike Wallentin–Hermann v Alitalia , ECR 2008, P. I–11061, 2 December 2008; Case C–
83/10, Aurora Sousa Rodríguez and Others v Air France SA, 13 October 2011 (a preliminary ruling). 
9
 Case C–22/11 Finnair Oyj v Timy Lassooy [2012] (preliminary reference). 
10
 Case C–12/11 Denise McDonagh v Ryanair Ltd [2012] (preliminary reference). 
11
 Case C–139/11 Joan Cuadrench Moré v Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij NV (KLM) [2012] (preliminary 
ruling). 
12
 Case C–112/11 ebookers.com Deutschland GmbH v Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen und 
Verbraucherverbände – Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband eV [2012] (preliminary ruling); It should be noted 
that this case was brought on the interpretation of Regulation (EC) 1008/2008 on common rules for the 
operation of air services in the Community OJ [2008] OJ L293/3. 
13
 Case C–410/11 Pedro Espada Sánchez and Others v Iberia Líneas Aéreas de España SA [2012] (preliminary 
ruling). 
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among those whose institution is regulated by the [Montreal] Convention. The system 
prescribed in Article 6 simply operates at an earlier stage than the system which results from 
the Montreal Convention’.14 (emphasis added) 
 
 There also appears to a considerable divide between EU air passenger rights and the 
Montreal Convention in terms of the actual application and general applicability of the two 
regimes to individual cases. For instance, the United Kingdom (UK) courts apply the 
provisions of the Montreal Convention without, or at most with little, interpretation whereas 
the CJEU tends to take what has been called a ‘hybrid approach’ 15; historically, the CJEU 
has taken jurisdiction to interpret substantive rules of the Convention so as to clarify, or 
arguably even expand the scope and broaden the logic of Regulation 261/2004.  
 
 In Europe, but also beyond Europe insofar as preliminary rulings of the CJEU concern 
flights operated by non-EU carriers and passengers from third countries, the CJEU’s judicial 
intervention has indeed caused a confusing state of affairs for industry and consumers, and is 
in desperate need of legislative recast. In essence, three areas of consumer protection require 
urgent review: (1) ‘extraordinary circumstances’, (2) burden sharing and (3) compensation.  
 
 First, legislative clarification of the ambiguous phrase ‘extraordinary circumstances’ 
contained in Regulation 261/2004 and the impact of such situations is needful. In Wallentin–
Hermann, the CJEU held that the words ‘extraordinary circumstances’ in Art. 5(3) of 
Regulation 261/2004 should be interpreted strictly, commenting that ‘a technical problem in 
an aircraft which leads to the cancellation of a flight is not covered by the concept of 
“extraordinary circumstances” [...], unless that problem stems from events which, by their 
nature or origin, are not inherent in the normal exercise of the activity of the air carrier 
concerned and are beyond its actual control’.16 (emphasis added) 
 
 In response to a tendency amongst airlines to let passengers sit out the delay rather than to 
cancel flights in the wave of its ruling in Wallentin–Hermann, the CJEU’s Grand Chamber 
confirmed the joined cases of Sturgeon and Others17 and Böck and Lepuschitz in Nelson and 
Others18, and held that inconvenience to passengers resulting from long delay is comparable 
to inconvenience brought about by cancellation, and results in damage (i.e. loss of time) that 
                                                 
14
 Case C–344/04 The Queen on the Application of International Air Transport Association, European Low 
Fares Airline Association v Department for Transport [2006] ECR I-403, para 46. 
15
 Jeremias Prassl, ‘Case C–410/11 Pedro Sanchez v Iberia: Shared Baggage, Single Interpretation’ (Eutopia 
Law, 3 December 2012) <http://eutopialaw.com/2012/12/03/case-c-41011-pedro-sanchez-v-iberia-shared-
baggage-single-interpretation/> accessed 13 May 2014. 
16
 Case C–549/07 Friederike Wallentin–Hermann v Alitalia  [2008] ECR I–11061; (See Jochem Croon, ‘Placing 
Wallentin–Hermann in line with continuing airworthiness, a possible guide for enforcers of EC Regulation 
261/2004’ [2011] 36(1) Air & Space Law 1. 
17
 Joined Cases C–402/07 and C–432/07 Christopher Sturgeon and Others v Condor Flugdienst GmbH (C–
402/07) and Stefan Böck and Cornelia Lepuschitz v Air France SA (C–432/07) [2009] (references for 
preliminary rulings). 
18
 Joined Cases C–581/10 and C–629/10 Emeka Nelson, Bill Chinazo Nelson, Brian Cheimezie Nelson v 
Deutsche Lufthansa AG (C–581/10) and The Queen, on the application of: TUI Travel plc, British Airways plc, 
easyJet Airline Company Ltd, International Air Transport Association v Civil Aviation Authority [2012] ECR I-
1. 
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must be redressed in accordance with the principles of equal treatment and non-
discrimination. 
  
 The CJEU explained in Nelson and Others, referring to its earlier decision in IATA and 
ELFAA, that nothing in the Montreal Convention indicates an intention by the Convention’s 
authors ‘to shield air carriers from any form of intervention other than those laid down by 
those provisions, in particular action which could be envisaged by the public authorities to 
redress, in a standardised and immediate manner, the damage that is constituted by the 
inconvenience that delay in the carriage of passengers by air causes, without the passengers 
having to suffer the inconvenience inherent in the bringing of actions for damages before the 
courts’.19 
 
 For reference, Art. 19 of the Montreal Convention provides as follows: ‘The carrier is 
liable for damage occasioned by delay in the carriage by air of passengers, baggage or cargo. 
Nevertheless, the carrier shall not be liable for damage occasioned by delay if it proves that it 
and its servants and agents took all measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the 
damage or that it was impossible for it or them to take such measures’.20 
 
 Whilst the phrase ‘damage occasioned by delay’ is not defined in the Montreal 
Convention, Art. 22 of the Convention provides an upper limit to the damage.21 Taking a 
literal interpretation of that provision, it would appear that damage occasioned by delay is the 
cost of toiletries, clothing, etc., rather than the loss of time that causes inconvenience. 
 
 According to CJEU interpretation, however, Art. 19 of the Montreal Convention ‘implies 
[...] that the damage arises as a result of a delay, [and] that there is a causal link between the 
delay and the damage and that the damage is individual to passengers depending on the 
various losses sustained by them’ 22 , whereas the obligation for an air carrier to pay 
compensation under Regulation 261/2004, ‘does not arise from each actual delay, but only 
from a delay which entails a loss of time equal to or in excess of three hours in relation to the 
time of arrival originally scheduled ... [and] ... whereas the extent of the delay is normally a 
factor increasing the likelihood of greater damage, the fixed compensation awarded under that 
regulation remains unchanged in that regard, since the duration of the actual delay in excess 
of three hours is not taken into account in calculating the amount of compensation payable 
under Article 7’.23 (emphasis added)  
 
 The CJEU therefore deems the obligation to pay a fixed compensation as compatible with 
Art. 29 of the Montreal Convention on basis of claims.24 It is also worth nothing that the 
CJEU has ruled that the seemingly ever-present right to care obligation under Art. 9 of 
                                                 
19
 Nelson and Others (n18) para 4. 
20
 [2001] OJ L194/39.  
21
 The limit was originally set at 1000 Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) and is currently at 1131 SDRs, which is 
roughly equivalent to USD 1750. 
22
 Ibid para 50. 
23
 Ibid para 54. 
24
 Ibid para 56. 
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Regulation 261/2004 operates at an earlier stage than the Montreal Convention.25 The CJEU 
stressed that ‘like the inconveniences referred to in IATA and ELFAA, a loss of time cannot 
be categorised as “damage occasioned by delay” within the meaning of Article 19 of the 
Montreal Convention, and, for that reason, it falls outside the scope of Article 29 of that 
convention’.26  
 
 Thus, in Nelson and TUI Travel and Others, the CJEU summed up the requirement to 
compensate passengers and settled the matter: Regulation 261/2004 is consistent with the 
Montreal Convention since, inter alia, ‘the loss of time inherent in a flight delay constitutes 
an inconvenience which is not governed by the Montreal Convention. Consequently, the 
obligation to compensate passengers whose flights are delayed falls outside the scope of that 
convention, but remains additional to the system for damages laid down by it’.27 
 
 It would be interesting to put the questions above to the drafters of the Montreal 
Convention to determine the extent of CJEU finesse.  
 
 What is more, if an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ does arise and passengers are stranded, 
as were seven million when the volcanic ash from the Eyjafjallajökull volcano required 
closure of European airspace that incidentally also led to a USD 5bn loss of global GDP, 
there is a lack of information available on the possible implications of burden sharing 
between airlines, airports and hotels in such situations. Clearly, an impact assessment is 
necessary. 
 
 Finally, a closer look at proportionality of compensation is essential. 
 
 In McDonagh28, an Irish court questioned, on the basis that ‘extraordinary circumstances’ 
is not defined in Art. 2 of Regulation 261/2004, whether Art. 5 must be interpreted as 
meaning that ‘circumstances such as the closure of part of European airspace as a result of the 
eruption of the Eyjafjallajökull volcano’. A passenger, McDonagh, claimed EUR 1129 for 
incurred expenses when delayed for several days following cancellation of her Ryanair flight; 
the cost of the ticket was only EUR 98. 
 
 The CJEU ruled that the closure of airspace constituted ‘extraordinary circumstances’ 
within the meaning of Regulation 261/2004, which do not attract Art. 7 compensation but 
also do not release air carriers from their obligation laid down in Articles 5(1)(b) and 9 of the 
Regulation to provide care29, effectively for as long as the circumstances persist. As regards 
the limit of reimbursement, the CJEU commented that this should be ‘in the light of the 
specific circumstances of each case, proved necessary, appropriate and reasonable to make up 
                                                 
25
 Wallentin–Hermann (n16) para 32; Nelson and Others (n18) para 57. 
26
 Nelson and Others (n18) paras 49, 55. 
27
 CJEU Press Release, ‘Judgment in Joined Cases C–581/10 Nelson and Others v Deutsche Lufthansa AG and 
C–629/10 TUI Travel and Others v Civil Aviation Authority’ (23 October 2012) CJEU/135/12 2. 
28
 Case C–12/11 Denise McDonagh v Ryanair Ltd [2012] (preliminary ruling). 
29
 Ibid para 34. 
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for the shortcomings of the air carrier in the provision of care to that passenger, a matter 
which is for the national court to assess’.30 
 
 By way of comparison, compensation available under current EU legislation for 
passengers travelling by railway, sea/inland transport and bus/coach transport is far more 
proportionate to the cost of the ticket with tiered stages of delay. With that said, it is 
important to note that proportionality in these instances is most certainly linked to the 
availability of substitutable modes of travel and ‘modern’ enacted EU legislation for 
passengers on land and sea modes of transport. 
 
 Within the past few months, European Parliament has taken steps towards consolidating 
the existing legislation, prompted by European Commission proposals announced in March 
2013 to amend Regulation 261/2004; progress has been made yet, politically, it has been no 
easy task31. 
 
 
V. United States 
 
The United States (US) regime on air passenger rights and applicability of the Montreal 
Convention in US courts may offer a useful albeit simpler example for comparison, too.  On 
the question of whether the Warsaw Convention pre-empts claims brought under domestic 
law, the US Supreme Court held in El Al Israel Airlines v Tseng:  ‘Given the Warsaw 
Convention’s comprehensive scheme of a liability rules and its textual emphasis on 
uniformity, we would be hard put to conclude that the delegates at Warsaw meant to subject 
air carriers to the distinct non-uniform liability rules of the individual signatory nations’.32 
 
 The Tseng judgment has been applied, mutatis mutandis, in subsequent cases brought in 
the US courts which involved interpreting similar provisions of the Montreal Convention. 
Nobre v American Airlines33 is a semi-recent example. Whilst these cases deal with damages 
claims for personal injury, it is clear that in the post-Tseng era in the US, the Montreal 
Convention provides an exclusive cause of action for claims; other claims under local law are 
pre-empted. Clearly this is not the current position in Europe. 
 
 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
This comment has identified two regimes that impact on and implicate airlines, airports and 
air passengers, concurrently. A brief examination of the two reveals that they have different 
                                                 
30
 Ibid para 51. 
31
 In February 2014, MEPs backed changes amidst 400 or more proposed amendments. The changes are pending 
adoption. 
32
 El Al Israel Airlines v. Tseng 525 US 155, 161 (1999)  
33
 Nobre v American Airlines WL 5125976 SD Fla (2009) 
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purposes. Current international law aims to provide a system of limited liability for airlines 
under contracts of carriage, whereas consumer protection regimes, such as the EU’s 
Regulation 261/2004, seek to require airlines to offer air passengers care, assistance and 
compensation if they are stranded or even inconvenienced.  
 
 Do they work in tandem? Are they in competition? Can they co-exist? 
  
 The CJEU has, in short, concluded that the rights granted to air passengers under 
Regulation 261/2004 are consistent with but additional to, or simply operate at an earlier 
stage than that of existing international law, in particular the Montreal Convention, though 
this surely boils down to the creation of brilliant finesse rather than disrespect for, or 
evidence of an intention to undermine, international law. 
 
 In the light of the recent call for core principles for the protection of air passengers as 
consumers at the international level, it will be needful to consider the approaches taken by 
other national and regional courts with respect to interpretation and application of the 
Montreal Convention as that policy guidance is developed. 
 
 A review of the Montreal Convention should not be ruled out. Indeed, it may no longer be 
fit for purpose given the proliferation of air passenger rights regimes that, as the CJEU 
jurisprudence on Regulation 261/2004 evidences, may challenge the effectiveness of 
international law.  
 
 At every turn to date, the CJEU has interpreted the EU regime as being entirely consistent 
with the Montreal Convention, so what is to prevent national courts from coming to the same 
conclusions in future? In other words, without global, core principles on consumer protection, 
legislators and courts the world over may resort to less textual, more teleological 
interpretations of the provisions of the Montreal Convention, an international law that has a 
very different purpose from that of consumer protection, namely to establish a limited liability 
regime for airlines.  
